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SIMONE WElL ON GREECE'S DESIRE FOR THE 
ULTIMATE BRIDGE TO GOD: THE PASSION 
Helen E. Cullen 
Simone Wei! believed that Greece's vocation was to build bridges between 
God and man. This paper argues that, in light of Weil's "tradition of mystical 
thought," the Christian vocation is an extension of the Greek. The search for 
the perfect bridge in Homer, Sophocles and Plato comes to fruition in the 
Passion of Christ. The Greek thinkers, especially Plato with his Perfectly Just 
Man, already had implicit knowledge of the Passion's truth. 
Weil held an exceptionally broad view of the spiritual part of human 
beings. She argues in an essay called "The Romanesque Renaissance"! that 
we can trace our "spiritual treasures" back to the various revelations had 
by every country of pre-Roman antiquity. 2 Greece was one of the coun-
tries that had a revelation: 
.. .it was the revelation of human misery, of God's transcendence, of 
the infinite distance between God and man." 
In this essay, I will develop Weil's complex view that the Passion of 
Christ is the fulfilment of the Greek vocation: to bridge the distance 
between God and man. As Weil says: 
Haunted by this distance, Greece worked solely to bridge it. This is 
what made her whole civilization ... .In the minds of the best of the 
Greeks there dwelt the idea of mediation between God and man, of 
mediation in the descending movement by which God seeks man. 
This is the idea expressed in the notion of harmony, of proportion, 
which is at the centre of all their thought, all their art, all their science, 
and of their whole conception of life. When Rome began brandishing 
her sword, Greece had only just started fulfilling her vocation as 
builder of bridges: 
Weil saw the whole Greek culture from Homer, Sophocles, 
Pythagoras to Socrates and Plato as different manifestations of the desire 
for the perfect bridge which finally came to fruition in the person of 
Christ. 
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The idea of mediation achieved full realization, the perfect bridge 
was seen, divine Wisdom became visible, as Plato had hoped, to mor-
tal eyes. Tn this way, the Greek vocation was perfected by becoming 
the Christian vocation.' 
A. Creek Epic Poetry and Tragedy: Human Misery and Mystical Love 
Homer was, according to Weil, the first of the Greeks to express an under-
standing of, the infinite distance between God and man, of human afflic-
tion - human misery - through his study of necessity in its manifesta-
tion as force in the Iliad. He described how all who were subjected to the 
"empire of might" take on the same coldness as that which dominates 
them: a coldness equalled only by the bitterness in their hearts. Bitterness, 
Weil claims, is the human cry in the face of a violence which is pitiless and 
kills. Homer described how this cry turns into self-destruction and 
destruction of the other. Weil comments on Homer's description of force's 
domination of the human soul: 
... the soul that is dominated by war cries out for deliverance; but 
deliverance itself appears in tragic guise, in the form of extreme 
destruction .... The soul, which is forced by the existence of an enemy, 
to destroy that part of itself implanted by nature, believes it can only 
cure itself by the destruction of the enemy, and at the same time the 
death of beloved companions stimulates the desire to emulate them, 
to fo]]ow their dark example:6 
Ah, to die at once, since without my help 
My friends had to die. How far from home He 
perished, and I was not there to defend him. 
Now I depart to find the murderer of one so beloved: 
Hector. I shall receive death at whatever moment 
Zeus and all the other gods shall accomplish it? 
According to Weil, Homer shows us that the despair which thrusts 
towards death is the same despair that impels one to kill: 
I know that my fate is to perish here. 
Far from my loved mother and father; 
but still T will not stop till the Trojans 
have their glut of war.S 
The soul dominated by force no longer belongs to the human race. 
Homer shows that, in war, both vanquished and victor are driven by the 
same madness towards annihilation. And, both are determined to make 
an object out of the other. The misery of such a condition afflicts both alike 
so that the strong and the weak are shown to be equals as they are in truth. 
The ravages of death afflict us all; Homer shows the human condition in its 
nakedness. Weil argues that Homer's intention is to evoke sorrow for those 
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human beings who are reduced to matter before death: 
The cold brutality of the facts of war is in no way disguised just 
because neither victors nor vanquished are either admired, despised 
or hated .... the similes which make them appear. .. as beasts or 
things ... cannot make us feel either admiration or disdain, but only 
sorrow that men could be thus transformed." 
Homer's genius was, Weil claims, to show that human beings dominat-
ed by the empire of force should be loved and not despised. She finds a 
parallel between the Christian notion "love thy enemy" - weak or strong 
- and the notion, expressed in the Iliad, that in the other we see an essen-
tial human weakness that we share. The misery of the human condition is 
to be so distant from God. Our common human lot is to be subjected to 
force in its many manifestations. Thus, we have to hate force but pity those 
who had not the love to resist: 
... this poem is a miraculous object. The bitterness of it is spent upon 
the only true cause of bitterness: the subordination of the human soul 
to might .... That subordination is the same for all mortals ... .No one in 
the Iliad is spared, just as no one on earth escapes it. None of those 
who succumb to it is for this reason despised .... Here the humiliation 
of a soul that is subject to constraint is neither disguised .... neither is it 
an object of disdain. More than one human being, wounded by the 
degradation of affliction, is here held up to be admired. W 
After demonstrating the horror of human degradation in all its artistic 
beauty, Homer shows, by contrast, how miraculous are pure justice and 
love. Expressions of pure love show the distance which separates those 
degraded by force from those who are, with grace, able to love: 
... this double ability of turning men to stone is essential to might, and 
a soul placed in contact with it only escapes by a sort of miracle .... The 
resulting whole would be a dismal monotony were there not, sprin-
kled here and there, luminous moments, brief and divine moments in 
the souls of men. Tn such moments the soul which awakes ... awakes 
pure and intact....ln that soul there is no room for ambiguous, trou-
bled or conHicting emotions, courage and love fill it all." 
Weil quotes Homer's descriptions of "pure love" by which men and 
women were able to escape the dominion of force. Some examples are: 
how the "tradition of hospitality" takes on one occasion precedence over 
the "blindness of combat"; expressions of familial love; expressions of fra-
ternal love; pure expressions of love and tenderness between a husband 
and wife; "the most beautiful friendship, that between companions in com-
bat"; and finally, 
... the triumph, the purest love of all, the supreme grace of all wars, is 
that friendship which mounts up to brim the hearts of mortal ene-
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mies. This quells the hunger to avenge the death of a son, of a 
friend. 12 
What makes Homer's Iliad one of the finest examples of Greek genius, 
according to Wei!, is that he understands the sorrow of human misfortune. 
All human beings - whether friend or foe - are seen to be equally pre-
cious and their degradatjon in the face of destiny to be a great sorrow. 
Homer's insight is to show that "chance" has delivered millions of human 
souls to the door of destiny "without preparation." He conveys how vast 
and powerful the dominion of force is and how pitifully weak human 
beings are in comparison. And yet, it is this very human weakness that 
must be loved just because it is our common human lot. The strongest per-
son or the weakest is shown to be nothing in the face of the force which 
kills. The only thing dis6nguishing one person from another in such cir-
cumstances is that one may by grace consent to God's love whereas anoth-
er may not. To recognize this fragility in the face of force and, to love it 
because it is an expression of God's love is at the same tjme to renounce the 
use of force oneself. Those who do not recognize that it is only grace 
which enables them to escape the dominion of force deceive themselves in 
thinking they are different from the afflicted . 
... the understanding of human suffering is dependent upon justjce, 
and love is its condition. Whoever does not know just how far neces-
sity and a fickle fortune hold the human soul under their dominion 
cannot treat as his equals, nor love as himself those who chance has 
separated from him by an abyss. The diversity of limitations to which 
men are subject creates the illusion that there are different species 
among them which cannot communicate with one another. Only he 
who knows the empire of might and knows how to respect it is capa-
ble of love and justice. l3 
One way one shows respect for love and justice is by listening to reason 
even in face of "the empire of might." But, as Homer shows, all thought 
that it might be more reasonable to live and not seek revenge, to let it go, 
falls "into the void." For example, Achilles once spoke the words of reason: 
Nothing is worth life to me, not all the rumoured wealth of Illium, 
that so prosperous city ... 
For one may capture oxen and fat sleep 
But a human life, once lost, is not to be recapturedY 
Achilles, being a leader, could have adhered to the law of limitation by 
restricting his people and the Greeks to a "moderate use of might./I This 
would demand that Achilles appear weak; that he renounce using all his 
strength. But Achilles does not have the insight to practise this virtue. 
Such detachment from appearances requires a renunciation of desire 
and force; a virtue Weil describes as equivalent to "a constant dignity in 
weakness./I This is, in fact, the virtue the Greek Stoics perfected. Given 
Weil's analysis, one could speculate that the Stoics had learned of this 
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virtue from Homer and other Greek writers, such as Sophocles or 
Aeschylus, who did not admire force, but showed it proper respect. They 
understood that it took all of the human ingenuity and virtue possible not 
to be ruled by necessity. Weil admired the Greeks for their study of the 
mechanism of force and the difficulties involved in keeping a detached 
view of its pull so that one could be open to a reasonable and just way. 
Homer's genius in revealing the relation between force and human mis-
ery, and the human virtues, "justice and the love that is its condition," was 
only the beginning of a whole culture of writers and artists who drew on 
the same revelation. Weil finds in Sophocles' tragedies similar expres-
sions of the contrary feelings of the bitterness of affliction and love which 
thrives even in a void. Weil sees in Sophocles' tragedy, Electra the working 
of this love which she calls the love of the mystic. 
Weil analyses Electra's affliction and how it causes her undue pain and 
degradation. She had lost her father, brother, and all that she had known 
was taken over by strangers. She was most embittered by the loss of her 
brother, Orestes, who she thought was dead. Electra's love for her brother 
was the one thing that made it possible for her to live on. Weil describes 
Electra's love as the love of the "dark night of the soul." Nothing could 
replace this love as she held in horror all other goods. This is the kind of 
love, love in the void, that waits for God. Weil interprets Orestes reappear-
ance as God's answer to Electra's tears of sorrowful love: 
... Orestes, who had taken her for a slave, recognizes her by her tears. 
He informs her that the urn is empty. He reveals himself to her. 
There is a double recognition. God recognizes the soul by its tears, 
then makes Himself known to it. 
Just when the soul is spent and has ceased to wait for God, when 
the external affliction of the interior aridity forces it to believe that 
God is not a reality, if then nevertheless the soul still loves, and holds 
in horror those worldly riches which would take his place, then it is 
God who comes to the soul, reveals Himself, speaks to it, touches it. 
This is what St. John of the Cross names the dark night of the soul. 15 
This juxtaposition of affliction and love was what made this tragedy a 
description of the human condition in its most extreme form. The Greeks, 
claims Weil, had the ability to see that affliction is the one human condition 
that has God's love hidden in its depth. For that reason alone, affliction 
deserves respect. 
In Weil's view of Christianity she finds the same human virtues that 
she finds in Greece. We can, she claims, better understand Christ's afflic-
tion and Christ's message if we see it from the point of view of a unique 
truth which contains the same message throughout time. The message 
concerns the one transcendent God. Out of love, God gave us the freedom 
to choose to open ourselves to God's love/ grace or not. Our misery con-
sists in our separation from God. To overcome this miserable human con-
dition, we have to renounce all that separates us from God. The Greek 
writers such as Homer, Sophocles, and Aeschylus show us how vast the 
domain of force, which is the name given to all that separates us from God, 
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really is. To renounce force in all of its manifestations and to love the 
afflicted who are crushed by force is the way, according to Weil's interpre-
tation of these Greek writers, to build a bridge to God. Weil claims that the 
Greeks help us understand the true message of the Passion: 
Is it not an extremely powerful thing to be able to say this to all unbe-
lievers: without the haunting of the Passion, this Greek civilization, 
from which you draw all of your thoughts without exception, would 
never have existed? 16 
B. Plato's Bridge to God: The Perfectly Just Man Foretells the Christ 
In looking for an image of perfect justice, Plato applied the knowledge 
which an awareness of the role of affliction gives us to an Image of the 
Perfectly Just Man in the Republic. Weil analyses Plato's thought on the 
Perfectly Just Man from two points of view: first, the Perfectly Just Man in 
society, and secondly as Mediator between God as Spirit (One, Unity) and 
human beings (two, duality). 
Weil examines how the Perfectly Just Man mediates between appear-
ance and reality through Plato's study of the soul's journey towards assim-
ilation with God. It is at the third stage of the soul's progress toward God 
that she locates "prestige" - the screen which must be pierced if the soul 
is to continue on or not. At this third stage, the soul either does or does not 
encounter "the beauty in laws and institutions." It is also at this stage one 
encounters either the "morality of the Great Beast" or "supernatural moral-
ity." To help us to understand what an immense task it is to escape the 
influence of the "morality of the Great Beast," Simone Weil uses Plato's 
metaphor of the cave. 
Weil argues that it is a mistake to think that the metaphor of the cave 
relates to knowledge and that sight signifies the intellect. Rather, she 
claims, the sun is the good and sight (which she calls the "eternal part of 
the soul") is the faculty which can relate to the good. The things in the 
cave are unreal because they cannot be objects of love. These "unreal 
objects" are the things which please the Great Beast, a society which is 
ruled by a morality that has no relation to love. Weil quotes Plato's famil-
iar description of the sophistic moral teaching that takes its cue from what 
the people want - without giving any attention to the good: 
Call whatever pleases this animal good, and whatever displeases him 
evil, and they have no other criterion. They call righteous and beauti-
ful those things which are necessary, being incapable of seeing, or of 
showing others, to what degree the essence of the necessary differs 
from that of the good. (Republic VI, 493c) 
Thus, Weil points out, all the things which bring social prestige are 
believed to be beautiful and good even though they belong to the realm of 
pure illusion. These are: " ... the desire of the lover.. .. The pleasures of eat-
ing and drinking .... Riches, power, advancement, decorations, honours of 
every kind, reputation, recognition .... "lc The most notable is power 
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because as Weil says, ninety per cent of it is prestige. This is remarkable 
because power "determines all in this world." Even though power is 
largely an illusion, it succeeds in deluding those who have it on their side. 
As Weil shows in her commentary on the Iliad, those who have the power 
believe that it is more than prestige and this leads them to go to war. But, 
at this point they go too far since war spares neither the weak nor the 
strong - power and prestige are shown to be illusions when the victims 
are at the point of death. Nevertheless, Weil reminds us of a conclusion 
she had reached in Oppression and Liberty: "The supreme social value, or 
rather the unique value, is prestige."18 
Still using the metaphor of the cave, she claims that prestige is the shad-
ow of the puppets which are reflected on the walls of the cave. The pup-
pets, she thinks, are not intended to be real. They are artificial things; they 
represent social institutions. Social institutions provide a collectivity with 
conventional good as well as its shadow, prestige. Weil uses an example to 
make this clear: the miser sees in gold the shadow of gold, prestige, and 
desires gold for this reason. Social convention makes of gold a means of 
exchange; in this sense, gold is a "purely conventional good." The con-
ventional good has a certain reality because relative good takes whatever 
reality it has from the Good. But the shadow of this good, prestige, has no 
reality. It is an illusion. That is why Weil claims that "There is a great dif-
ference between illusion and convention."l'! Furthermore, in order to rec-
ognize this difference and the good of social conventions, one has to tum 
away from prestige, the shadows of the cave. Only then can one recognize 
that "In all human institutions the images of truths of a supernatural order 
are to be found."oU 
Weil thinks that even a bad social order must be obeyed and be the 
object of charity because it still provides images of the truth of a supernat-
ural order: 
Obedience to the Great Beast which conforms to the good - that is 
social virtue. 
A Pharisee is someone who is virtuous out of obedience to the 
Great Beast. 
Charity can and should love in every country all that is a condition 
of the spiritual development of individuals, that is to say, on the one 
hand, social order, even if it is bad, as being less bad than disorder. ... " 
Yet, there is a difference between those who obey the Great Beast as a 
Pharisee and those who obey in spiritual nakedness as Christ did. The 
first, remain consumed by the desire for prestige, whereas, the latter 
renounce all prestige. It is the total renunciation of prestige which, accord-
ing to Weil, makes Christ a Perfectly Just Man: "It is the absence of pres-
tige, and not the physical suffering, which is the very essence of the 
Passion."TI 
Plato, says Weil, knew this and that is why he made the laws and social 
institutions the intermediary between a legitimate leader, "a man stripped 
bare," and the Great Beast in the Statesman. The laws and social institu-
tions can mediate because, if they are legitimate, they provide an image of 
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the supernatural order, that is, they constitute an equilibrium: 
"Equilibrium is the submission of one order to another, the order which 
transcends the first being present in it under the form of something infi-
nitely small."23 Plato, she thinks, defined the laws and institutions as con-
stituting this kind of equilibrium, which is a harmony in the Pythagorean 
sense: 
Laws and institutions constitute another equilibrium which is placed 
as if at the intersection of virtue and natural necessity. But it is 
impossible to make out exactly what Plato has in mind: whether it is 
the city as a metaphor, as an enlarged image of the soul, as it is stud-
ied in the Republic, or a study of the harmony belonging to social rela-
tions, such as one finds in the Statesman. Anyway the Pythagorean 
idea of harmony as the union of contraries, and the combination of 
that which limits and of that which is limitless, most successively 
dominate these three studies.24 
Now to return to our stages of the soul's progress towards assimilation 
with God. If at the stage of making laws, one can see the images of the 
truths of a supernatural order in the laws and social institutions, then, 
according to Weil, one must be one of the elect few: "For all of us, save a 
few of the elect, are consumed by desire for prestige."25 
For the elect few, the laws and social institutions can be something of 
beauty, something to love even if undue pain is inflicted on one by them -
as in the case of the Perfectly Just Man. This is indeed one of the stages of 
the soul's progress and no doubt the most difficult stage. This is the stage 
when the elect have to endure affliction. We need the elect because it is 
only through them that a society can have access to the supernatural 
morality. But we tend to completely ignore the elect or, as the Perfectly 
Just Man, treat them like a common criminal. The only way the elect few 
can appear here below is completely devoid of all prestige.26 We, however, 
are completely taken up with prestige. In fact, it is a mark of the human 
condition that reality can only appear in this world completely veiled. 
Thus, to encounter this reality, we must get beyond all appearances; the 
only way is to renounce all social prestige. 
The laws and social institutions are supposed to maintain an equilibri-
um of forces between authority and obedience: "A well ordered society 
would be one where the State only had a negative action, comparable to 
that of a rudder: a light pressure at the right moment to counteract the first 
suggestion of any loss of equilibrium."27 But the laws and social institu-
tions will not be perfectly just because "the model of justice for men is a 
just man."28 Also, she points out that "Our world is the kingdom of necessi-
ty. The appearance of justice is of this world. Real justice is not of this 
world."29 
The Perfectly Just Man could only appear here completely devoid of his 
reality - as Christ was deprived of His reality and treated like a common 
criminal, a condemned criminal. This depiction of the Perfectly Just Man 
in the Republic (361b-e) was, for Weil, a clear indication that Plato is refer-
ring to the divine incarnation: 
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The passage concerning the perfectly just man demonstrates the idea 
of divine incarnation more clearly than any other Creek text .... in 
order that a man 'in no way differ from justice itself,' should be the 
same in all respects as justice, 'divine Justice, from beyond the skies, 
must descend upon earth.'30 
Weil argues that Plato " ... refused to demonstrate that such a thing could 
be possible." However, she thinks that his thoughts were of the divine 
incarnation because, for him, the perfect has greater reality than the imper-
fect; thus, the model of perfection for relatively just men must be an actual-
ly existing perfectly just man. Without an earthly appearance in space and 
time, the perfectly just man would remain an abstraction. Wei! thought 
that Plato believed this appearance could happen and she quotes a passage 
from the Timaeus: "divine Justice, from beyond the skies, must descend 
upon the earth."31 
Weil thinks that, in the Republic, Plato is making the claim that just men 
can only assimilate with God by passing by way of the Perfectly Just Man. 
She supports this claim by quoting a passage from the Tlzcatetus: 
One must be careful to notice how Plato clearly affirms that justice in 
itself is not a sufficient model. The model of justice for men is a just 
man. 
It is he, doubtless, who is also the divine and blessed ideal spoken of 
in the Theatctus. When Plato speaks of assimilation with this 
model, .... the word assimilation in Greek, and especially for such a 
Pythagorean as Plato, is a geometrical term which refers to the identi-
ty of relationships, to proportion .... No proportion is possible between 
man and God except by mediation. The divine model, the perfectly 
just man, is the mediator between just men and God. 32 
But, according to Weil, human beings are not innocent; the affliction of the 
original sin is that we are faced with an incompatibility between appear-
ance and reality. After the original sin, human beings can no longer come 
face to face with reality. A veil now covers reality so that we get no more 
than glimpses of it. Under these conditions, perfect justice had to appear 
as perfect injustice in order to respect the necessity of appearance. The 
Perfectly Just Man had to appear as completely unjust while being in reali-
ty thoroughly just. 
Thus, the Perfectly Just Man must appear naked, without honour and 
unrecognizable. Only in this way would His appearance contradict His 
reality: 
Take the just man, let us show him forth by our words. Simple and 
generous, desiring, as Aeschylus says, not the appearance but the 
reality of the good. Let us take away all appearance ... let him be 
shown naked of all things except justice, ... that while committing no 
injustice he may have the greatest reputation for injustice in order 
that this may be a touchstone for his justice .... (Republic 361b )33 
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In order for the human soul to progress towards assimilation with God 
he or she must follow Christ's method of turning away from appearance 
towards the reality hidden by the appearances. At each stage, the appear-
ance is both the barrier and the way through. Weil's "method of attention" 
involves facing the contradiction between appearance and reality and wait-
ing for the mediation of Supernatural Love. Weil holds that "Insoluble con-
tradictions have a supernatural solution." For the Perfectly Just Man to 
appear here as a condemned criminal, naked and without the prestige that 
the appearance of justice would give him is a contradiction. Weil points 
out that it is absurd for the Perfectly Just Man to appear in a manner con-
tradictory to that which He is to be a Model of. That is why, she thinks 
the Passion is the supernatural solution to this insoluble contradiction. 
Only the Love between the Father and the Son could solve this contradic-
tion. People who possess grace can see this solution. All others are 
weighed down by the contradiction. Even many of Christ's followers, 
Weil points out, had doubts when, "as Plato would have him," he lost "all 
appearance of justice." 
We see that Weil has developed her method of attention through her 
analysis of Plato's thought. Furthermore, she believes that Plato is carrying 
on a long tradition of mystical thought which culminates in the "foretelling 
of the Christ" 
In short, only the penitent thief has seen justice as Plato conceived it, 
naked and perfect, veiled beneath the appearance of the criminaL 
Plato, in going so far as to suppose that the perfectly just is not rec-
ognized as just, even by the gods, had the premonition of the most 
piercing words of the Gospel: 'My God, my God, why hast thou for-
saken me? 34 
Weil points out that the reason for the Perfectly Just Man's suffering in 
Plato differs from the Christian idea of redemption or the idea that Christ 
came to suffer for us. But, "there is a bond between the two ideas." The 
link, as we have seen, is that the appearance masks the reality. The appear-
ance is false. So, although our desire, which Weil believes constitutes our 
very being, may be desire for the good, it is only inclined toward evil until 
conversion. Only true humility can pierce the screen of appearance and 
move towards reality. This is why Christ is the key because he consented 
to be reduced to nothing in order to assimilate with God: "The Father is the 
creation of being, the Son is the renunciation of being ... Humility is the con-
sent to this reduction."3s 
C. Christ's Passion: the Cure for Our Duality 
As I pointed out above, Simone Weil saw Plato's analysis of the Perfectly 
Just Man to be his way of expressing his desire for Christ. Furthermore, 
she thinks that Plato even saw that Christ's Mission on earth was to cure us 
of our "original sin." Weil finds this analysis in the "Dissertation of 
Aristophanes" in the Symposium where Aristophanes says that Love is the 
only thing that Gill cure men of their misery. Weil takes Love to be refer-
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ring to the Love which mediates between man and God. Aristophanes 
claims that Love is the only physician for man because it is only through 
Love that the human being can overcome the affliction of duality. Christ 
also compares His Mission to the work of a physician. 
Weil believes that Aristophanes' dissertation is a myth about original 
sin. Man was once a "complete being" and therefore much happier. But 
he committed the sin of "pride" by desiring to be like God: this was the 
original sin. Man wanted to have all the same powers as God. Zeus got 
very angry and wanted to chastise man for overstepping his bounds. Weil 
claims this is very similar to the story of Adam and Eve. However, in 
Aristophanes' myth the point that human misery has to do with men and 
women's duality and ultimately their separation from God is clearly stat-
ed. For originally, according to Aristophanes' story, the human being was 
at once male and female. He or she was complete and had no need for the 
other being both same and other at once. After the sin, Zeus chastised man 
by cutting him in half; thus, human beings became man and woman. But 
Weil claims that Zeus' choice to chastise man rather than completely 
destroying man was an act of Love and a desire to be loved by man. 
The quest is for Love because it is only Love which can re-unite the two 
halves. Without Love, humans feel a lack and sense of insufficiency; conse-
quently, we always desire Love and a reunion. 
Love in us is therefore the feeling of our radical insufficiency in con-
sequence of sin, and the desire coming from the sources of our being 
to be reintegrated into the state of completion.36 
This myth is the story of the human condition - of our misery as being 
in a state of duality while always desiring completion which was our state 
before sin and what we should be: 
Our vocation is unity. Our affliction is to be in a state of duality, an 
affliction due to an original contamination of pride and injustice.37 
Weil argues that the use of the sexes is only meant to give us a "sensible 
image" of our dualistic condition; therefore carnal union should not be 
mistaken for a remedy to that condition. Human beings encounter duality 
in all aspects of life and their goal in each case is to try to overcome it. But 
we cannot since "duality which is our affliction" is the human condition. 
We are divided from that which we love, that which we know, and that 
which we act upon as subject is divided from object. Unity is when the 
subject and object are the same. Only God is united in this way. Human 
beings can only become united like this through an assimilation with God 
which is accomplished through love of God .. 
Any desire to escape from the state of duality is a sign of love in us. 
However, it is very important to properly direct that desire. This is why 
human beings need the model of the "perfectly just man" - the original 
sin was an indication that man had lost sight of Justice and of the way to 
achieve unity. Thus, Christ's Mission in healing the original sin is to show 
us the way out of the affliction of duality. Weil claims that in the myth 
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"Love is the physician" and in the Gospels, Christ is. Just as Love in the 
myth was the "right physician" to cure us of our duality and be the 
redemptive god, so Christ was "the right physician" to heal our duality, for 
He came to earth to be our Redeemer. 
Christ, claims Weil, in His extreme afflicted state on the Cross was sepa-
rated from His Father by the greatest possible distance; thus, He was, at 
this point, the example of absolute duality . 
... God cuts in two the Soul of the World. This represents duality (in 
the Hindu sense). 111e Cross is this duality. In order to find the One, 
we have to exhaust duality, go to the very extreme of duality. This 
means crucifixion."' 
Christ, as Plato had foreseen, had to go the infinite distance to be the 
model - to show man the way to escape their duality and be united with 
God. To do this, Christ had to give up all, to renounce all that existence 
entailed. Christ suffered in complete nakedness, completely without pres-
tige. The beauty of the Passion can be seen through the parallel that can be 
drawn between Christ's abnegation and God's renunciation in Creation. 
To be a human being and to consent to not having any earthly power or 
wealth, and ultimately consent not to exist; that is the supreme expression 
of the folly of Love. It is this complete and absolute renunciation of all that 
distinguishes Christ from the martyrs. Christ, unlike the martyrs, could 
not fall back on the prestige that the appearance of justice gives. He was 
deprived of all appearance. There was no joy, as there is for the martyrs, in 
Christ's suffering, only extreme affliction. 
The Passion is the harmony of the union of contraries. Weil claims that 
such extreme suffering is the reality of the union of the contradictories of 
man-God. Man cannot be united with God without death because any 
union between God and man denotes a unity with God; therefore, no 
longer being man. God in creating the Universe withdrew from it and man 
and all other creatures were given existence by this abdication. This 
allowed man to have "free will." Thus, any union between man and God 
on earth would be a contradiction; it would mean a union of Being and not-
being. This means that God is not only Mediation Himself but also a media-
tion of Mediation. In other words, God, through His constant Love, is a 
Mediation between Himself and His Creation. And through the Love of 
His only Son, Christ, God mediates His original and constant Love. The 
reason it is a mediation of Mediation is because the Son is given 
autonomous Love by becoming a human Person. This is what Weil calls a 
"spiritual quartering" which is passion. God first divides Himself from His 
Creation. These are the first two parts of the quartering. Then, God divides 
Himself again through His Son when His Son descends to earth and lives 
the Passion. God could only do this out of pure Love for His creature: 
The union of contradictories means a spiritual quartering. It is itself a 
passion, and is impossible without extreme suffering.'" 
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The reason God appeared on earth under the appearance of extreme 
injustice was because the reality of the God-man union could only mani-
fest itself as a union of contradictories: the reality of extreme justice com-
bined with its exact opposite the appearance of extreme injustice. Weil 
claims that the Passion bears witness to the fact that true contradiction 
leads us to God: 
The perfectly just man: the union of extreme justice with the appear-
ance of extreme injustice. Christ did not simply suffer, he suffered a 
penal form of suffering .... Extreme justice combined with the appear-
ance of extreme injustice is an example of that contradiction which 
leads to God.40 
Weil claims that although suffering itself has no significance, suffering 
does point to what does have significance; it points to reality itself as long as 
human beings don't lose sight of it because of the suffering. We must see 
suffering as the necessary effect of the contradiction which makes up cre-
ation itself, i.e. the separation of God, the reality, from His creation, the 
appearance. Christ gives us the perfect image, a Model through the cruci-
fixion of the relation between extreme suffering and contradiction. If we 
can see the reality behind the suffering, it can have redemptive value for us: 
We must use suffering qua contradiction that has been experienced. 
By using it in this way it acquires a mediatory, and consequently a 
redemptive, value. We must use it qua spiritual quarteringY 
The greatness of Christianity, seen from the Platonic perspective, is that 
it saw suffering and affliction to be in keeping with God's order; thus, the 
Greeks understood that human beings must not seek in God a remedy for 
affliction or suffering rather they must use suffering to bring them closer to 
Christ. This is, however, very difficult because, as Christ has shown us, 
everyone, almost without exception, turns their back on the afflicted. 
Furthermore, because they are human, the afflicted themselves begin to 
hate and be disgusted by themselves. Weil claims that by the laws of sensi-
bility human beings are repulsed and disgusted by the horror of being 
reduced to the state of a thing. This is the worst possible state imaginable 
for the human being. Thus, without even being conscious of it, we treat the 
afflicted with disdain: 
Men have the same carnal nature as animals. If a hen is hurt, the oth-
ers rush upon it, attacking it with their beaks. This phenomenon is as 
automatic as gravitation. Our senses attach all the scorn, all the revul-
sion, all the hatred which our reason attaches to crime, to affliction. 
Except for those whose whole soul is inhabited by Christ, everybody 
despises the afflicted to some extent, although practically no one is 
conscious of it.42 
Christ, on the Cross, is the "perfect image" for the afflicted because they, 
like Christ, are not criminals; and yet, they suffer a distance almost as great 
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as the "infinite distance" which separated Christ on the Cross and God. 
And, also like Christ, they are capable of loving God through this distance 
because God created them to love. It is important, however, that they know 
this. Weil confirms that God created out of love and for love. "He created 
beings capable of love from all possible distances." This is why Christ went 
the infinite distance in identifying with the thieves while on the cross. God 
went the greatest possible distance, the infinite distance because no other 
being could possibly do this. The crucifixion was an act of love; it was God 
going the infinite distance. If God was prepared to go this distance, Weil 
thought that the afflicted should consider themselves fortunate to be close to 
reality, "at the foot of the cross." 
CONCLUSION 
Weil believed that it was Greece's vocation to build bridges between 
God and man and showed how Homer's, Sophocles', and Plato's desire for 
the "perfect bridge" came to fruition in the Passion of Christ. 
Homer in the Iliad and Sophocles in Electra show us how vast the 
domain of force is and suggest that the way to overcome this force and 
build a bridge between us and God is to love the afflicted. Weil thinks 
that, in doing so, these Greek writers have demonstrated that they had 
implicit knowledge of the true message of the Passion. 
Weil sees the whole of Plato's writings from the point of view of his Greek 
vocation: to build a bridge to God. Plato's Perfectly Just Man (in the Republic 
and the Theatetus) has the utmost respect for social order, but, disdains the 
prestige which consumes those who obey the Great Beast. Both Plato's 
Perfectly Just Man and Christ totally renounce prestige. Both appear on 
earth as condemned criminals because the reality of justice has to appear 
masked in this world, the kingdom of necessity. Plato's depiction of the 
Perfectly Just Man thus foreshadows the divine incarnation. Plato shows us 
the contradiction between the reality of the Perfectly Just Man and his 
appearance as a common criminal. Christ solves Plato's contradiction by liv-
ing the Passion. 
Weil also finds in Plato's Symposium the view that "Love" is the "right 
physician" for our duality. Christ used the same words to describe His 
Mission on earth. He is this "Love" as He came to earth to cure us of our 
original sin and its consequences: our affliction of duality. As our Redeemer, 
Christ in His Passion traveled the greatest possible distance from the Father 
whilst still maintaining His Love of His neighbor and God. The afflicted are 
nearest to Christ in their suffering whether or not they maintain their love. If 
they do continue to love, they show they have taken the way of the Cross. 
Weil's view of the "Greek vocation" becoming the "Christian vocation" 
extends the historical past of Christianity thus showing its "continuity in 
time." By penetrating the Greek "tradition of mystical thought," she deep-
ens our understanding of the contradictory nature of Christ's appearance 
and increases our awe of the beauty of its culmination: the Passion. 
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